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Abstract. Modal logics are widely used in computer science. The com-
plexity of their satisfiability problems has been an active field of research
since the 1970s. We prove that even very “simple” modal logics can be
undecidable: We show that there is an undecidable modal logic that can
be obtained by restricting the allowed models with a first-order formula
in which only universal quantifiers appear.
1 Introduction
Modal logics are widely used in many areas of computer science. See, for example,
[BZ05,FHJ02,CDF03,HMT88,LR86b,BG04,Moo03,ABvdT10]. The complexity
of modal satisfiability problems has been an active field of research since Lad-
ner’s work in the 1970s [Lad77]. Early work focused on the complexity of single
logics, but more recent work has focused on handling the computability and
complexity for an infinite number of logics, see, e.g., [HS08,DK98,AvBN98].
Our ultimate goal is to classify the complexity of “all” modal logics. We
are particularly interested in elementary modal logics, i.e., modal logics whose
models are defined by a first-order formula, since modal logics used in practice
are often defined in this way. In addition, complexity analysis is often easier
when looking at models rather than at axioms.
An important first step towards classifying the complexity of all elementary
modal logics is to determine which modal logics are decidable. Our concrete goal
in this paper is to find a “simplest” undecidable modal logic.
A particularly interesting simple class of elementary modal logics are the
universal elementary modal logics, in which the class of models is defined by a
universal first-order formula. Not only do many common modal logics belong
to this class, it is also a class that is on the borderline of being decidable. In
particular, it is known that many universal Horn elementary uni-modal logics are
in PSPACE, and it is conjectured that all these logics are decidable [HS08]. On
the other hand, it is known that global satisfiability, i.e., satisfiability in all worlds
in a model, is undecidable for universal elementary uni-modal logic [Hem96].
⋆ Supported in part by NSF grant IIS-0713061, the DAAD postdoc program, and by
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To show undecidability for modal logics, we typically need to be able to make
the models look like a grid, and we need a way to access all the worlds in the grid,
as well as a way to access the two direct successors of a world. An early example
of this is that 2-dimensional temporal logic on N × N with modal operators
©u and ©r that access the direct “up” and “right” successors of a world, and
u and r that access all worlds that are above or to the right of the current
world is undecidable [Har83]. The undecidability also holds if u and r are
the only modal operators [Spa90]. Other examples of undecidable modal logics
include various logics of knowledge and time [HV89,LR86a,Spa90], various logics
that allow identification of worlds [BS93,GG93], and most products of transitive
modal logics [GKWZ05].
All these logics are multi-modal and certainly not universal. As will be ex-
plained in Section 5.1, universal first-order formulas are not enough to enforce
a grid-like structure. Still, there exists a first-order universal formula such that
global satisfiability for uni-modal logics is undecidable [Hem96]. Section 3 will
explain the idea behind the construction from [Hem96] and why this construc-
tion can not be used to show that satisfiability for a universal elementary modal
logic is undecidable.
However, using a much more complicated construction (see Section 5.1 for a
high-level overview and the rest of Section 5 and the appendix for details), we
will show that there exists an undecidable universal elementary uni-modal logic.
And this result holds even if we are not allowed to use the equality predicate in
the first-order universal formula describing the models. And so we have indeed
found a “simplest” undecidable modal logic.
2 Preliminaries
Modal logic syntactically extends propositional logic with an additional unary
operator  (a dual operator ♦ abbreviates ¬¬). The modal depth of a formula
ϕ, denoted with md (ϕ), is the maximal nesting degree of the -operator in ϕ. A
model for a modal formula is a graph with individual propositional assignments.
To be precise, a frame F is a directed graph (W,R), where the vertices in W
are called “worlds.” A model M = (W,R, pi) consists of a frame (W,R) and a
function pi assigning to each variable the set of worlds in which x is true. We
say the model M is based on the frame (W,R). If F is a class of frames, then
a model is an F -model if it is based on a frame in F . We often write w ∈ M
instead of w ∈ W . For a world w ∈ M, we define when a modal formula φ is
satisfied at w in M (written M,w |= φ). If φ is a variable x, then M,w |= φ if
and only if w ∈ pi(x). As usual, M,w |= φ1 ∧ φ2 if and only if M,w |= φ1 and
M,w |= φ2, and M,w |= ¬φ iff M,w 6|= φ. For the modal operator, M,w |= φ
if and only if M,w′ |= φ for all worlds w′ with (w,w′) ∈ R.
A standard way to define classes of frames is to use first-order formulas. The
frame language is the first-order language containing (in addition to Boolean
operators) the binary relation R, interpreted as the edge relation in the graph,
and the equality relation =. The semantics are defined in the obvious way. For
example, a frame satisfies the formula ϕˆtrans := ∀xyz(xRy ∧ yRz =⇒ xRz)
if and only if it is transitive. We use ˆ to denote first-order formulas, e.g., ϕˆ
is a first-order formula, while φ is a modal formula. We say that a frame is a
ψˆ-frame if it satisfies the first-order formula ψˆ. We say that a model M is a
ψˆ-model (which we write as M |= ψˆ) if M is based on a ψˆ-frame. The basic
frame language is the frame language without equality.
Following notation introduced in [HS08], for a first-order formula ψˆ, K(ψˆ)
is the logic in which a modal formula φ is satisfiable if and only if there is a
ψˆ-model M and a world w ∈ M such that M,w |= φ. Such logics are called
elementary modal logics. For a formula ψˆ over the frame language, we consider
the following problem:
Problem: K(ψˆ)-SAT
Input: A modal formula φ
Question: Is there a ψˆ-model M and a world w ∈M with M,w |= φ?
As an example, the problem K(ϕˆtrans)-SAT is the problem of deciding if a
given modal formula can be satisfied in a transitive frame, and is the same as the
satisfiability problem for the logic K4. We say that a modal formula is globally
satisfied in a model if it holds at every world in the model.
The main result of this paper is that there exists a universal first-order
formula ϕˆfinal over the basic frame language such that K(ϕˆfinal)-SAT is coRE-
complete.
3 Relation with previous work
The result from the literature closest to ours is Theorem 3.2 from [Hem96], which
shows the coRE-hardness of global modal satisfiability for the class of frames
defined by the following first-order universal formula (we omit quantification
from first-order formulas, since in this paper every variable in every appearing
first-order formula is universally quantified):
((xRy1 ∧ xRy2 ∧ xRy3) → ((y1 = y2) ∨ (y1 = y3) ∨ (y2 = y3))) ∧
 ∧
1≤i≤4
(xRyi ∧ yiRzi) =⇒
∨
1≤i<j≤4
(zi = zj)

 .
Our result strengthens the above result in several ways: We prove undecid-
ability already for the (local) satisfiability problem, i.e., given a modal formula
ϕ, decide whether there is a model and some world in it that satisfies ϕ. Sat-
isfiability is often much easier than global satisfiability: In the above example
from [Hem96], (local) satisfiability is in NP, while global satisfiability is unde-
cidable. Intuitively, proving undecidability of the global satisfiability problem
by encoding the grid is easier than undecidability for the local problem due to
the following: A key property of the grid that needs to be enforced in the con-
struction is that every world in a model has a specific set of reachable worlds
(each world has exactly two successors reachable in one step, and three worlds
that it can reach in two steps). Clearly, enforcing the existence of successors
is impossible using only universally quantified formulas. With a modal formula
however, requiring at least two direct successors can be enforced very easily by
using a formula ♦u ∧ ♦u. In the global satisfiability problem, one can require
this formula to globally hold in the model, and hence enforce the existence of
the grid structure relatively easily. In the (local) satisfiability problem however,
there is no way to require this formula to globally hold in the model. This is
the main reason why, at least in the context of classes of frames defined by uni-
versal first-order formulas, the global satisfiability problem allows us to express
“positive” conditions (such as the existence of at least two successors) in a much
more easy way than the satisfiability problem.
In our proof, we employ some of the techniques used to obtain the above-
mentioned result in [Hem96]. In particular, the first step in our proof is to estab-
lish undecidability of the global satisfiability problem over a class of frames that
is similar to the one defined by the above formula. However, this step does much
more than simply reproving the result from [Hem96]: The class of frames that we
construct here is considerably less restrictive than the one defined above. One
reason for this is that with the more restricted language we have available (the
basic frame language, which does not contain equality), we cannot restrict our
frames as strongly as with the above formula from [Hem96]. More importantly
however, we need to construct a class which then can serve as the basis for prov-
ing hardness of (local) satisfiability. Therefore, we construct a class of frames that
is tailor-made for being able to prove our main result later. A key issue here is
that of reflexivity: In contrast to the grid model, we establish undecidability for
a class of frames that includes reflexive frames—in fact, the reflexive frames are
those which will later allow us to reduce the global satisfiability problem to the
(local) satisfiability problem. In particular, directly reducing global satisfiability
for the class of frames defined by the formula above to (local) satisfiability for
a class of frames defined by a universal first-order formula over the basic frame
language does not appear to be easier than our approach.
Technically, in addition to our first-order formulas being more complex than
those used in [Hem96], a main difference is the use of what we call abstraction
of a model: Essentially, our first-order formulas enforce the relevant conditions
of the grid not in a model M itself, but in a model M/∼ obtained from M by
compressing cliques of worlds into a single world.
4 Main Result
We show that modal satisfiability is undecidable already for a formula over the
basic frame language in which every appearing variable is universally quantified:
Theorem 1. There exists a universal first-order formula ϕˆfinal over the basic
frame language such that K(ϕˆfinal)-SAT is coRE-complete.
It is well known and easy to show that modal satisfiability for a class of frames
defined by a first-order formula is in coRE since this problem can be phrased as
the negation of a first-order implication (see, e.g., [BdRV01, Lemma 6.32]). It
therefore remains to construct ϕˆfinal such that K(ϕˆfinal)-SAT is coRE-hard.
We also mention that as an immediate corollary of the above, we obtain the
following result: The uniform version of the satisfiability problem, in which both
the modal and the first-order formula are given in the input, is coRE-complete.
5 Proof of the main result
5.1 Global satisfiability in the grid model
We prove coRE-hardness by a reduction from the global grid satisfiability prob-
lem: The grid frame has world set N × N, and the accessibility relation R =
{((i, j), (i+ 1, j)), ((i, j), (i+ 1, j)) | i, j ∈ N}. A grid model is a model based on
the grid frame. The global grid satisfiability problem is the following:
Problem: Global-Grid-Sat
Input: A modal formula ψ
Question: Is there a grid-model M that globally satisfies ψ?
In [Hem96], the following theorem was proven:
Theorem 2. Global-Grid-Sat is coRE-hard, even restricted to inputs ψ with
md (ψ) ≤ 1.
Our proof will force models to behave “essentially grid-like.” However, it is
immediately clear that universal first-order formulas are not expressive enough
to accomplish this: It is easy to see that if F is a frame, and F ′ is a subframe
of F (i.e., an induced subgraph), then F ′ satisfies every universal first-order
formula over the frame language that F satisfies. More precisely, universal first-
order formulas with equality can express exactly those graph properties that can
be characterized with a finite forbidden subgraph. Hence with equality in our
first-order language, we can express properties like “each world has at most two
direct successors,” which is a characteristic property of the grid frame, using the
formula (xRy1 ∧ xRy2 ∧ xRy3) → ((y1 = y2) ∨ (y1 = y3) ∨ (y2 = y3)). Note
that, as explained in Section 3, this formula was used in the proof of [Hem96,
Theorem 3.2].
As mentioned previously, requiring “positive” conditions, e.g., that every
world in a model has direct successors with certain properties, is reasonably easy
in the global satisfiability setting, but considerably more difficult in the local
setting. In addition, even the above property of having at most two distinct
successors cannot be expressed by a universal first-order formula in the basic
frame language, i.e., the frame language without equality: It is easy to see that no
such formula can distinguish the singleton with two successors from the singleton
with three successors.
Therefore, in order to simulate the grid in our modal models, we need to
exploit the interplay between the first-order and the modal aspect of the satis-
fiability problem. The main ingredients to our proof are the following:
1. In order to circumvent having to express equality in the above formula, we
employ the following construction: We use a first-order formula similar to
the one above, except that instead of requiring yi = yj, we demand that
there is a symmetric edge between these worlds with the first-order formula
(yiRyj) ∧ (yjRyi). With some additional requirements, we ensure that the
relation x ∼ y is an equivalence relation, where x ∼ y holds if there is a
symmetric edge between x and y. We then “abstract” modal models to their
∼-equivalence classes. This construction allows us to “simulate” equality in
the basic frame language. On the abstraction we can therefore express all
“forbidden subgraph” properties of the grid, since as mentioned above, these
properties can be expressed using universal first-order formulas with equality.
2. In order to ensure that the above-mentioned abstraction is sound, we use
modal formulas to ensure that the relation ∼ is not only an equivalence
relation, but also respects propositional assignments: For a relevant subset
of variables, ∼-equivalent worlds will share the same valuation. This allows
us to regard equivalence classes as single worlds in the abstracted model.
3. For the structure of the model, it remains to express the “positive” properties
of the grid, for example that every world indeed has two distinct successors.
While the existence of successor worlds can be easily required with the modal
operator ♦ (which in this step of the proof we can essentially use “globally”
as we are still only dealing with the global satisfiability problem), we need to
ensure that there exist successors in a different equivalence class—i.e., suc-
cessors that are still present in the abstraction. We express this requirement
using subtle interplay between first-order and modal requirements.
4. Finally, the most important issue is to express the global requirement of
Global-Grid-Sat: The formula ψ is required to hold at every world of the
grid, whereas modal satisfiability is an existential property. To solve this, we
force the existence of a “universal” world, i.e., a world connected to every
other world. In this world, the global requirement “ψ must hold everywhere”
can be simulated with the (local)  operator. In this part of the proof, we
crucially rely on features of the class of models considered in the first part,
which allow us to perform this construction.
5.2 Expressing the grid: Universal first-order aspects
We follow the proof strategy outlined above, and start by defining a set of uni-
versal first-order formulas that force the “abstraction” of a model to obey some
essential properties of the grid. The formulas are intuitively understood best
when thinking of symmetric edges as “equality.” As mentioned above, we use
x ∼ y to express that in a frame, there is an edge from x to y, and one from y
to x (the frame will always be clear from the context). We also use x ∼ y as an
abbreviation for (xRy ∧ yRx) in formulas.
Definition 1. Let ϕˆ1-step be the universal first-order formula
(xRy1 ∧ xRy2 ∧ xRy3) =⇒

 ∨
1≤i≤3
(x ∼ yi) ∨
∨
1≤i<j≤3
(yi ∼ yj)

 .
This formula corresponds to the property mentioned above: In the grid, each
world has only two distinct successors. When reading ∼ as equality, the formula
exactly captures this requirement. We use an analogous approach to state an-
other important feature of the grid: While each world has two distinct successors,
say y1 and y2, and each of these again has two distinct successors, say z
1
1 , z
1
2 , z
2
1
and z22 , in the grid each world can reach only three distinct worlds in two steps.
Hence, two of the zij must coincide. This is expressed by the following formula:
Definition 2. Let ϕˆ2-step be the universal first-order formula

 ∧
1≤i≤4
(xRyi ∧ yiRzi)

 =⇒

 ∨
1≤i≤4
(x ∼ yi) ∨
∨
1≤i≤4
(yi ∼ zi) ∨
∨
1≤i<j≤4
(zi ∼ zj)

 .
When reading ∼ as equality, this formula states that if z1, z2, z3, z4 are worlds
reachable from x via intermediate worlds yi (which are different from both x and
all zi), then two of the zi must coincide. Note that the formulas introduced up to
now closely mirror the formula in [Hem96]. The major differences and additions
in the construction follow now. The third formula we use ensures the relation ∼
mentioned above is an equivalence relation:
Definition 3. Let ϕˆ∼eq be the first-order formula
(
(x ∼ y) ∧ yRz) =⇒ xRz
)
∧
(
(x ∼ y) ∧ zRy) =⇒ zRx
)
.
This formula ensures that ∼-“equivalent” worlds have the exact same in- and
outgoing edges, hence it forces∼ to be an equivalence relation in reflexive models.
The conjunction of the formulas above combines the first-order aspects of the
grid that we can force with universal formulas over the basic frame language:
Definition 4. Let ϕˆgrid := ϕˆ1-step ∧ ϕˆ2-step ∧ ϕˆ
∼
eq.
5.3 Properties of abstracted frames
We now formally define abstractions of frames, which as mentioned before are
obtained by compressing ∼-equivalence classes into a single world.
Definition 5. For a reflexive frame F = (W,R), where F |= ϕˆ∼eq, we define the
abstraction of F , denoted with F/∼, to be the frame (W/∼,R/∼) , where W/∼ is
the set of ∼-equivalence classes of W , and [w]R/∼[w′] if and only if wRw′.
The relation R/∼ above is well-defined, since if w ∼ w′ and wˆ ∼ wˆ′, then
wRwˆ implies w′Rwˆ, and this implies w′Rwˆ′ (by ϕˆ∼eq). We now show that for a
frame that satisfies the formula ϕˆgrid, its abstraction has two key properties of
the grid frame, and additionally is reflexive—reflexivity does not actually help in
establishing the undecidability result for global satisfiability, but as commented
before will make it easier for us to later move to the (local) satisfiability problem.
Lemma 1. Let F = (W,R) be a reflexive ϕˆgrid-frame. Then F/∼ satisfies the
following properties:
1. F/∼ is reflexive,
2. each world [w] in F/∼ has at most two direct successors different from [w],
3. for each world [w] in F/∼, there are at most three worlds that can be reached
on a path from [w] of length two that does not use any reflexive edge.
Proof. 1. Let [w] be an equivalence class. Since R is reflexive, we know that
wRw, hence due to the definition of (W,R)/∼, we have that [w]R/∼[w].
2. Assume that some equivalence class [w] has direct successors [w1], [w2], and
[w3] in (W,R)/∼, where all of these four classes are distinct. Obviously, for
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have that ([wi], [w]) /∈ R/∼, since otherwise [wi] = [w] would
follow due to the definition of ∼. By the properties of ϕˆ1-step, it then follows
that there are i, j such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3 and wiRwj and wjRwi, thus
wi ∼ wj , and hence [wi] = [wj ], a contradiction.
3. This follows very similarly: Assume that there is a class [x] with direct suc-
cessors [y1], [y2], [y3], and [y4], and classes [z1], [z2], [z3], [z4] such that for all
i, j we have [yi] 6= [x], [yi]R/∼[zi], [yi] 6= [zi], and for i 6= j we have [zi] 6= [zj ].
Since [x]R/∼[yi], there is an edge xRyi for all i. If there was an edge yiRx
for some i, then yi ∼ x and thus [x] = [yi] would follow, hence there is no
such edge. Similarly, since yiR/∼zi but [yi] 6= [zi], there is no edge ziRyi.
Therefore, since (W,R) |= ϕˆ2-step, we know that there exist i 6= j with ziRzj
and zjRzi, i.e., zi ∼ zj. This implies [zi] = [zj ], a contradiction.

We therefore know that the abstracted frame satisfies the main “forbidden
subgraph” properties of the grid frame—as mentioned before, we cannot hope
to enforce other properties of the grid frame using only universal first-order
formulas. For ensuring the remaining properties, we therefore use modal formulas
and propositional variables. There are two main differences between the grid
frame and the class of abstractions of ϕˆgrid-frames: First, worlds in abstractions
of ϕˆgrid-frames that correspond to more than one world in the original frame
are always reflexive. Second, the class of ϕˆgrid-frames (and thus the class of its
abstractions) is subframe-closed. Essentially, abstractions of ϕˆgrid-frames can be
seen as subframes of the reflexive closure of the grid frame.
5.4 Expressing the grid: Modal aspects
Above, we have expressed the universal first-order properties of the grid frame in
the formula ϕˆgrid. We now consider the second part of our abstraction process:
the valuation of the propositional variables. We will use the interplay between
modal formulas and the frame properties ensured with the results in the previous
section to address the following issues:
– We need to ensure that the abstraction is “sound,” i.e., leaves crucial modal
properties of the models invariant. The main issue is that we need to force all
“relevant” variables to have the same value in all ∼-equivalent worlds. This
leads to a well-defined propositional assignment for the abstracted frame, and
moreover ensures that truth of “relevant” modal formulas remains invariant
when moving to the abstraction of a model.
– As mentioned above, the abstractions constructed in the previous section
are necessarily reflexive. To simulate the (non-reflexive) grid, we will replace
the -operator with a construction that ensures that ψ only requires the
formula ψ to be true in the successors w′ 6= w of a world w.
– We have to enforce the “positive” properties of the grid frame, i.e., that
every world in fact does have two distinct successors.
Our abstraction does not take into account all variables, but only a subset
denoted with P—this will contain all variables appearing in the input formula
ψ for the Global-Grid-Sat problem that we will reduce from.
Definition 6. Let P be a set of propositional variables, and let M = (W,R, pi)
be a reflexive ϕˆ∼eq-model. We define the model M/∼ as
M/∼ := (W/∼,R/∼, pi/∼) ,
where the assignment pi/∼ makes the variable p true in an equivalence class [w]
if and only if it is true in all elements of [w], and lets all propositional variables
not in P be false everywhere. We call M/∼ the abstraction of M .
We will later only consider abstractions of models where the truth value of
a variable p ∈ P does not depend on the representative of a class [w]. This will
be enforced to ensure that M/∼ is a sound abstraction of with respect to the
propositional variables in P . For models that obey this restriction, the above
truth assignment will then be equivalent to setting p true in [w] if there is some
w ∈ [w] where p is true in the original model. We say that ∼ respects P in a
model M if w ∼ w′ implies that each variable p ∈ P is true in w if and only if it
is true in w′. We often omit the model M if clear from the context.
It is easy to see that this property implies that the abstraction introduced is
indeed sound, i.e., preserves truth of all modal formulas—at least as long as we
only consider reflexive models that also satisfy the first-order formula ϕˆ∼eq:
Lemma 2. Let P be a set of propositional variables, let M be a reflexive ϕˆ∼eq-
model such that ∼ respects P in M . Then for all w ∈W, and all modal formulas
ψ with VAR(ψ) ⊆ P , M,w |= ψ if and only if M/∼, [w] |= ψ.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the construction of ψ. If ψ is a
propositional variable p ∈ P , then this follows from the prerequisites, since for
w ∼ w′, p is true at w if and only if p is true at w′. The induction step for
propositional operators is trivial. Therefore, assume that ψ is of the form ξ,
and the claim holds for ξ. Since wRw′ is true if and only if [w]R/∼[w′], the
following is true:
M,w |= ξ iff for all w′ with wRw′, it holds that M,w′ |= ξ
iff for all w′ with wRw′ it holds that M/∼, [w′] |= ξ
iff for all w′ with [w]R/∼[w′] it holds that M/∼, [w′] |= ξ
iff M/∼, [w] |= ξ.

We therefore obtain the following: If M is a reflexive modal model that
satisfies the formula ϕˆgrid and in which ∼ respects P , then its abstraction is a
subframe of the reflexive closure of the grid that satisfies the same formulas ψ
as M does (for formulas ψ with VAR(ψ) ⊆ P ). Therefore, if we can enforce that
∼ respects P , we have can enforce the abstractions of our models to exhibit the
“forbidden subgraph”-features of the grid, without changing the set of satisfied
modal formulas. To enforce that ∼ respects P , we define the following:
Definition 7. For a set P of propositional variables, let ψPresp be defined as
ψPresp =
∧7
d=0
∧
p∈P ((d8 = d)→
((d8 = d) ∨ (d8 = (d+ 2) mod 8) ∨ (d8 = (d+ 3) mod 8))
∧ (p =⇒ ((d8 = d) =⇒ p))
∧ (p =⇒ ((d8 = d) =⇒ p)))
Here d8 is a variable over the natural numbers 0, . . . , 7. This obviously can
be represented by three propositional variables da8 , d
b
8, and d
c
8 as follows:
d8 = 0↔ (da8 ∧ d
b
8 ∧ d
c
8),
d8 = 1↔ (da8 ∧ d
b
8 ∧ d
c
8), . . .
d8 = 7↔ (d
a
8 ∧ d
b
8 ∧ d
c
8).
For a model M and a world w ∈M , with d8(w) we denote the unique value
d ∈ {0, . . . , 7} such that M,w |= (d8 = d). To increase readability, we often omit
the “mod 8” from the discussion and write d8 = d for d8 = d mod 8.
We now prove that the formula ψPresp works as intended, if it is globally
satisfied in a model—recall that a model M globally satisfies a modal formula
ψ if M,w |= ψ for all worlds w of M .
Lemma 3. Let P be a set of propositional variables, let M be a reflexive ϕˆgrid-
model that globally satisfies ψPresp. Then ∼ respects P ∪ {d8} in M .
Proof. Let w ∼ w′ in M , and let d = d8(w). We first prove that M,w
′ |=
(d8 = d), i.e., that the values of d8 are identical in ∼-equivalent worlds. Suppose
that this is not the case. Since M globally satisfies ψPresp, and there is an edge
wRw′, we know that M,w′ |= (d8 = (d + 2)) or M,w
′ |= (d8 = (d + 3)).
Since there also is an edge w′Rw, it also follows from ψPresp that M,w |= (d8 ∈
{d + 2 + 2, d + 2 + 3, d + 3 + 2, d + 3 + 3}), which is a contradiction, since
M,w |= (d8 = d). We therefore know that M,w
′ |= (d8 = d) as claimed. Now let
p be a variable from P . Since wRw′ and M,w |= ψPresp from M,w |= p it follows
that M,w′ |= p, and M,w |= p implies M,w′ |= p. Therefore, ∼ respects P as
required. 
The above lemma together with the earlier Lemma 2 and the fact that
VAR
(
ψPresp
)
= {d8} imply the following:
Corollary 1. Let M be a reflexive ϕˆ∼eq-model such that M globally satisfies
ψPresp. Then for all formulas ψ with VAR(ψ) ⊆ P ∪ {d8}, and all worlds w ∈M ,
we have that
M,w |= ψ if and only if M/∼, [w] |= ψ.
In particular, M/∼ globally satisfies ψPresp.
The variable d8 also allows to express “positive” conditions of the grid, i.e.,
the existence of certain successor worlds, and to reason about direct successors of
a world w that are not ∼-equivalent to w itself. In the sequel, we call successors
like this non-symmetric successors of w. Similarly, a non-reflexive successor of
w is a direct successor w′ of w with w 6= w′. This does not mean that w′ is an
irreflexive world, but that it is one reachable from w with an edge other than the
reflexive loop. The following formula now ensures that worlds that are connected
with a direct edge, but are not ∼-equivalent, have different values for d8.
Definition 8. Let ψsucc be defined as follows
ψsucc =
7∧
d=0
((d8 = d) =⇒ ♦(d8 = d+ 2) ∧ ♦(d8 = d+ 3))
This formula expresses that a world w with d8(w) = d has direct successors
with d8 = d+ 2 and d8 = d+ 3. We will later identify the “+2”/“+3”-successor
with the “upper”/“right” neighbor in the grid. If additionally the model globally
satisfies ψPresp, then from neither of these successors, the world w is reachable
in one step: From the definition of ψPresp, it follows that all direct successors of
the two ones whose existence is forced by ψsucc must have d8-values out of the
set {d+ 2, d+ 4, d+ 5, d+ 3, d+ 5, d+ 6}, none of which applies to the world w
itself. More generally, every world w′ 6= w reachable from w with at most two
steps has a different d8-value than w.
In addition, the successors with d8-values of d + 2 and d + 3 cannot be
connected with a direct edge in models satisfying ψPresp. Hence, each world has
two successors such that all of the three involved worlds are ∼-inequivalent—in
the abstraction, these worlds will give rise to three different equivalence classes.
It follows from the above that in ϕˆgrid-models globally satisfying the formula
ψPresp, the formula
∧7
d=0((d8 = d) =⇒ ((d8 6= d)→ ψ)) is true in a world w if
and only if ψ is true in all non-symmetric, non-reflexive successors of w.
5.5 coRE-hardness of global satisfiability
We now show coRE-hardness for the global satisfiability problem on reflexive
frames that satisfy ϕˆgrid. In itself, this result is not stronger than what was
already established in [Hem96], except for the fact that our formula only uses
the basic frame language, i.e., does not use equality. However, the real benefit
of the result in this section will become apparent in the next section: The class
that we define here allows us to easily reduce global to (local) satisfiability.
In Lemma 3, we have seen that if we can ensure that the formula ψPresp is
globally satisfied in a reflexive ϕˆgrid-model, then ∼ respects P and in this case
Lemma 2 tells us that our abstraction is sound, i.e., preserves truth values of
modal formulas. Since the formulas ψPresp and ψ
succ allow us to ensure that ∼
respects P and that every world has the two distinct successors as in the grid
frame, we therefore can use the construction from the previous section to prove
coRE-hardness in the case that we are able to enforce ψPresp ∧ ψ
succ globally.
Recall that Global-Grid-Sat remains coRE-hard when the input is restricted
to formulas ψ with md (ψ) ≤ 1. We therefore only consider such inputs for
Global-Grid-Sat from now on, and define our reduction as follows:
Definition 9. Let ψ be an input for Global-Grid-Sat with md (ψ) ≤ 1. Let
P = VAR(ψ), and let g(ψ) be defined inductively as follows:
– If ψ is a variable p, then g(ψ) = p,
– g(¬ψ) = ¬g(ψ),
– g(ψ ∧ ξ) = g(ψ) ∧ g(ξ),
– g(ψ) =
∧7
d=0((d8 = d) =⇒ ((d8 6= d)→ g(ψ))).
The reduction f is now defined as f(ψ) = g(ψ) ∧ ψPresp ∧ ψ
succ.
The only non-obvious part of the definition is the handling of the -operator.
As argued above, the translation of ψ requires ψ to be true in all non-reflexive,
non-symmetric successor worlds of the current one. This will be crucial when we
consider abstractions of models: The non-symmetric successors of a world w in
a model M directly correspond to the non-reflexive successors of the class [w] in
the model M/∼. We now prove that the reduction is correct (see Appendix).
Theorem 3. Let ψ be an instance of Global-Grid-Sat with md (ψ) ≤ 1. Then ψ
is a positive instance of Global-Grid-Sat if and only if f(ψ) is globally satisfiable
on a reflexive ϕˆgrid-model.
Proof. In the following, let P again be the set of variables appearing in ψ. First
assume that ψ is a positive instance of Global-Grid-Sat, i.e., there is a grid model
M = (N × N, R, pi) such that M, (i, j) |= ψ for all i, j ∈ N. We define the model
Mˆ as the one obtained from M as follows: Mˆ = (N× N, Rˆ, pˆi), where
– Rˆ = R ∪ {((i, j), (i, j)) | i, j ∈ N} , i.e., Rˆ is the reflexive closure of R,
– pˆi agrees with pi on VAR(ψ), and M, (i, j) |= (d8 = (3i+ 2j)).
Again, d8 can easily be expressed using three propositional variables. It is
immediate that Mˆ is reflexive and satisfies ϕˆgrid (note that in Mˆ , we have that
w ∼ w′ if and only w = w′). By choice of pˆi, it is also obvious that Mˆ globally
satisfies |= ψPresp and ψ
succ.
It remains to show that Mˆ globally satisfies g(ψ). Since M globally satisfies
ψ, it suffices to show that for all subformulas χ of ψ, and for all i, j ∈ N, it holds
that M, (i, j) |= χ if and only if Mˆ, (i, j) |= g(χ). We prove this by induction on
the construction of χ. Clearly, the only non-trivial case is when χ = ξ for some
ξ. Due to induction and since M is based on a grid frame, the following holds:
M, (i, j) |= ξ iff M, (i+ 1, j) |= ξ and M, (i, j + 1) |= ξ
iff Mˆ, (i+ 1, j) |= g(ξ) and Mˆ(i, j + 1) |= g(ξ)
iff Mˆ, (i, j) |= ((d8 6= d8((i, j))) =⇒ g(ξ))
iff Mˆ, (i, j) |= g(ξ).
Hence we know that Mˆ, (0, 0) globally satisfies f(ψ), as required.
For the other direction, assume that f(ψ) is globally satisfied on a reflexive
ϕˆgrid-model M = (W,R, pi). From M , we now obtain a grid model as follows:
We first consider the abstraction of M , which, since M is a ϕˆgrid-model and
M globally satisfies ψsucc, is essentially grid-like due to Lemma 1. Since M also
globally satisfies ψPresp, this abstraction is sound, i.e., still globally satisfies g(ψ).
We can then easily modify M/∼ to obtain a model that in fact is a grid and
globally satisfies ψ. More formally, let M0grid be defined as (W
0
grid, R
0
grid, pi
0
grid),
where
– W 0grid = W/∼,
– R0grid = {([w], [w
′]) ∈ R/∼ | d8([w]) 6= d8([w
′])},
– pi0 = pi/∼.
The above choice of R0 is well-defined, since due to Lemma 3, we know that
the value of d8 does not depend on the choice of the representative of a ∼-
equivalence class [w]. By construction, since M globally satisfies ψPresp, we know
that M0grid is exactly the model M/∼ with the reflexive edges removed. Since due
to Corollary 1, we know that M/∼ globally satisfies ψPresp, and satisfaction of this
formula clearly is invariant under removing reflexive edges, it follows that M0grid
also globally satisfies ψPresp.
We now prove that for all subformulas χ of ψ and all worlds w ∈M , we have
that M,w |= g(χ) if and only if M0grid, [w] |= χ. Since M globally satisfies ψ
P
resp,
we know from Corollary 1 thatM,w |= g(χ) if and only if M/∼, [w] |= g(χ). (Note
that VAR(g(χ)) = VAR(χ)∪{d8} ⊆ P ∪{d8}.) It therefore suffices to prove that
M/∼, [w] |= g(χ) iff M0grid, [w] |= χ. We prove the claim by induction on χ. Since
the only difference betweenM0grid and M/∼ is the set of edges between worlds, the
only interesting case is when χ = ξ. Due to Corollary 1, M/∼ globally satisfies
ψPresp. Hence the non-reflexive successors of a world [w] in M/∼ are exactly those
successors [w′] of [w] with d8([w
′]) 6= d8([w]) (recall that d8(w) only depends on
the equivalence class [w] due to Lemma 3).
Since g(χ) =
∧7
d=0((d8 = d) =⇒ ((d8 6= d) → g(ξ))), we have the
following:
M/∼, [w] |= g(χ)
iff M/∼, [w] |=
∧7
d=0(d8 = d)→ ((d8 6= d)→ g(ξ)))
iff M/∼, [w′] |= g(ξ) for all [w′] 6= [w] with ([w], [w′]) ∈ R/∼
iff (induction)M0grid, [w
′] |= ξ for all [w′] 6= [w] with ([w], [w′]) ∈ R/∼
iff (def. of M0grid)M
0
grid, [w
′] |= ξ for all [w′] with ([w], [w′]) ∈ R0grid
iffM0grid, [w] |= ξ
iffM0grid, [w] |= χ.
This completes the proof of the above claim. Since M globally satisfies g(ψ),
this implies that M0grid globally satisfies ψ. We now construct from M
0
grid a grid-
modelMgrid that still globally satisfies ψ as required. Recall thatM also satisfies
the first-order formula ϕˆgrid, and that M0grid is obtained form M/∼ by removing
edges. Therefore, Lemma 1 implies that from each world in M0grid there are at
most two worlds reachable in one step, and at most three worlds reachable in
two steps. Further, since M globally satisfies ψsucc, we know that each world
in M/∼ has at least two distinct successors. Since M0grid is obtained from M by
removing reflexive edges, M0grid also has this property.
The values of d8 in the individual worlds induces an ordering on the direct
successors of a world [w] in M0grid. First, recall that due to Lemma 3, the values
of d8 depend only on the equivalence of the worlds, hence we may use d8[w]
to denote the d8-value of all worlds in the equivalence class [w]. Due to the
properties of the abstraction, [w] has a unique direct successor world [w]↑ with
d8([w
↑]) = d8([w])+2, and a unique direct successor world [w]
→ with d8([w
→]) =
d8([w]) + 3. In addition, since due to Lemma 1, [w] can only reach three worlds
on a path of length two that does not use any reflexive edges, we know that∣∣{[w]↑→, [w]↑↑, [w]→→, [w]→↑}∣∣ = 3, hence two of these worlds must be the same.
Due to the distribution of the d8-values, it follows that [w]
↑→ = [w]→↑, since
these are the only two of the mentioned worlds that share the same d8-value,
namely d8([w]) + 5.
Thus M0grid can be written as a grid model using standard unfolding tech-
niques: We define the grid model Mgrid as follows:
– the world (0, 0) is a copy of some world [w] of M0grid.
– if (i, j) is a copy of the world [w]i,j , then let the worlds (i+1, j) and (i, j+1) be
copies of the worlds [w]→i,j and [w]
↑
i,j ofM
0
grid, and ensure that for (i+1, j+1),
the same copy of [w]→↑ = [w]↑→ is used.
It is clear that the set of modally satisfied formulas does not change in the
step fromM0grid toMgrid, and thatMgrid is indeed a grid model. Therefore,Mgrid
is a grid model that globally satisfies ψ as required. 
We mention that one can easily to use the first-order formula to force the
models to be reflexive, using the clause xRx. However, to be able to prove
undecidability for satisfiability instead of global satisfiability, it is crucial to leave
open the possibility of non-reflexive worlds, as we will see in the next section.
5.6 Removing globalness
The construction in the preceding section showed hardness for global satisfia-
bility for reflexive ϕˆgrid frames. To obtain our coRE-hardness result for (local)
satisfiability, we now express this global quantification with only the first-order
frame language and the modal language.
The main idea of the proof is the following: The construction forces the
existence of a “universal” world wu, i.e., a world that has an outgoing edge to
every other world in the model. Since this is an “existential” and not a “forbidden
subgraph” property, we cannot express this as a universal first-order formula
directly. We therefore use the following construction: We require that for every
pair of a world wu that is not reflexive, and every world w that has an incoming
edge, there is an edge from wu to w. This ensures that if the model contains an
irreflexive world wu, then wu is universal at least with respect to worlds that can
be reached from any other world at all. In particular, wu is universal with respect
to the submodel rooted at wu. Additionally, we require that any world that has
an incoming edge is reflexive. We therefore have established that if there is a
world wu that is irreflexive, then every world reachable from wu in any number
of steps is connected to wu directly, and every such world is reflexive.
These conditions can be enforced with the following formula:
Definition 10. Let ϕˆuniv be the universal first-order formula
(xRy =⇒ yRy) ∧ (wuRwu =⇒ (xRy =⇒ wuRy)).
The existence of an irreflexive world wu can easily be enforced with the modal
formula u ∧ u, where u is a new variable. We then enforce the formula ϕˆgrid
constructed in the previous section only on reflexive worlds, and can thus identify
the “reflexive part” of a model with a model of the type as considered in the
previous section. In particular, we know that global satisfiability of a formula of
the form f(ψ) on the “reflexive part” of our models is coRE-hard, where f is
the function used in the reduction from Theorem 3. We then use the universal
world wu to express the global satisfiability problem with a single -operator.
We therefore obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 4. There exists a universal first-order formula ϕˆfinal over the basic
frame language such that K(ϕˆfinal)-SAT is coRE-hard.
Proof. From Theorems 2 and 3, we know that the global satisfiability for formu-
las of the form f(ψ) on reflexive ϕˆgrid-models is coRE-hard.
In order to “simulate” global satisfiability, we want to add a “universal world”
to our models, i.e., a world that is connected to every world in the model except
itself. The reflexivity of worlds will be used to distinguish between the univer-
sal world and other worlds in the model. As mentioned above, the effect of the
formula ϕˆuniv is that any world wu which is non-reflexive does not have a pre-
decessor, and is connected in one step to every world that that does have one.
In particular, wu is a “universal world” with respect to the submodel generated
by wu.
Let ϕˆgrid ≡ ∀x1 · · · ∀xkϕˆ
grid
kernel(x1, . . . , xk), where ϕˆ
grid
kernel is quantifier-free. To
enforce ϕˆgrid, but only on the submodel containing all reflexive worlds, we define
ϕˆgridrefl := (x1Rx1 ∧ · · · ∧ xkRxk) =⇒ ϕˆ
grid
kernel(x1, . . . , xk).
We can now define the complete universal first-order formula ϕˆfinal such that
K(ϕˆfinal)-SAT is coRE-hard as follows:
ϕˆfinal := ϕˆuniv ∧ ϕˆgridrefl .
We show that a modal formula ψ is globally satisfiable on a reflexive ϕˆgrid-
frame if and only if u ∧u ∧ψ is satisfiable on a ϕˆfinal-model. Since deciding
whether the former holds is coRE-hard due to Theorems 2 and 3, this proves
the theorem.
First assume that M = (W,R, pi) is a reflexive ϕˆgrid-model and that M
globally satisfies ψ. We define a model Mˆ = (Wˆ , Rˆ, pˆi) such that
– Wˆ =W ∪ {wu} , where wu is a new world,
– Rˆ = R ∪ {(wu, w) | w ∈ W} ,
– pˆi = pi, except that the new variable u is true at wu and false at every world
other than wu, and the truth values of the remaining propositional variables
at wu are arbitrary.
It is obvious from the construction that Mˆ is based on a ϕˆfinal-frame and
that Mˆ, wu |= u ∧u ∧ψ.
For the converse, let M = (W,R, pi) be a model based on a ϕˆfinal-frame, and
let wu ∈W be such thatM,wu |= u∧u∧ψ. Note that sinceM,wu |= u∧u,
wu clearly is irreflexive (u holds in wu, but not in any successor of wu, hence wu
cannot be one of these successors). Now let Mˆ = (Wˆ , Rˆ, pˆi) be defined as follows:
– Wˆ = {w | (wu, w) ∈ R},
– Rˆ = R ∩ (Wˆ × Wˆ ),
– pˆi = pi restricted to Wˆ .
Note that Mˆ is reflexive by the construction of ϕˆfinal, and hence, since M |=
ϕˆgridrefl , and satisfaction of universal first-order formulas is invariant under deleting
worlds, it follows that Mˆ is based on a reflexive ϕˆgrid-frame. It remains to prove
that Mˆ, w |= ψ for all w ∈ Wˆ . Since M,wu |= ψ, it follows that M,w |= ψ for
all w ∈ Wˆ . It therefore it suffices to show that for all subformulas χ of ψ and
for all w ∈ Wˆ , that M,w |= χ if and only if Mˆ, w |= χ. We show the claim by
induction on the construction of χ, and the only non-trivial case is when χ = ξ
for a modal formula ξ.
First assume that M,w |= ξ, and let w′ be a successor of w in Mˆ . Since
Rˆ ⊆ R, it follows that w′ is also a successor of w in M . Since M,w |= ξ, this
implies that M,w′ |= ξ. Due to induction, it follows that Mˆ, w′ |= ξ as required.
For the converse, assume thatM,w 6|= ξ. Then there is some world w′ ∈W
such that hat wRw′ and M,w′ 6|= ξ. Since wRw′, and the world wu is irreflexive
in M due to the above, and M |= ϕˆuniv, it follows that wuRw
′ is an edge in M .
Therefore, by definition it holds that w′ ∈ Wˆ , and due to the definition of Rˆ
we have that wRˆw′ in Mˆ . Since due to induction we know that Mˆ, w′ 6|= ξ, it
follows that Mˆ, w 6|= ξ as required. This completes the induction and therefore
the proof of the theorem. 
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